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‘Behavioural modernity’ isn’t what it used to be. Once conceived as an integrated package of 
traits demarcated by a clear archaeological signal in a specific time and place, it is now 
disparate, archaeologically equivocal, and temporally and spatially spread. In this paper we 
trace behavioural modernity’s empirical and theoretical developments over the last three 
decades, as surprising discoveries in the material record, as well the reappraisal of old 
evidence, drove increasingly sophisticated demographic, social and cultural models of 
behavioural modernity. We argue, however, that some approaches to identifying and 
categorizing modernity have not kept up with this new picture. This is due to what we term 
‘Rubicon expectations’: classificatory and interpretive practices which look for or assume clear 
demarcations in behavioural and cultural processes.  
We develop a philosophical account of ‘investigative disintegration’ to capture how our 
understanding of behavioural modernity has changed, and how Rubicon-based practices have 
become inadequate. Disintegration, in the form we analyse, occurs when scientists’ conception 
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of a phenomenon shifts sufficiently to reshape an investigation’s epistemic structure. For 
behavioural modernity, the explanatory weight which once lay on identifying ‘switch-points’ in 
the innate suite of hominin cognitive capacities, lies now in understanding the social and 
demographic environments that were capable of sustaining and nourishing more complex 
material cultures. Finally, we argue that the phenomenon itself has not disintegrated to the 
point that we are left with no interesting explanandum: for all its mosaic, disparate nature, 
there are still good reasons for behavioural modernity to retain its central place in investigation 




Generalist accounts of science’s structure and progress have failed: science is a far too 
heterogeneous, contingent and human beast for universally applied, abstract schema to gain 
traction. In light of this, philosophers are developing local, context-sensitive and pragmatic 
models of science. Reduction is replaced with mechanistic understanding (Machamer, Darden & 
Craver 2000), unity with local integration, disunity with a patchwork of independent and 
interdependent representations, epistemic goods and tools (Wylie 1999, Brigandt 2010, 
Potochnik 2010, Mitchell 2003). Much work in this vein has attended to the formation and 
stability of research; how local integration and independence between evidence, theories and 
institutions structure science and its epistemic standing (Chang 2012, Ankeny & Leonelli 2016). 
However, progress in scientific investigation isn’t solely attained via integration, that is, aligning 
new data into stable theoretical horizons, research strategies and agendas. New data and new 
re-readings of available data may also disrupt fundamental research questions, approaches and 
concepts. In this paper we examine such disruption: investigative disintegration. How new, 
unexpected results reshape our conceptions of target phenomena, thus reshaping epistemic 
landscapes.  
We’ll examine disintegration through a close look at developments in the study of our 
species’ behavioural origins. ‘Behavioural modernity’ traditionally indicates distinctively human 
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behavioural and cultural expressions. The notion was initially introduced to mark the perceived 
time-lag between the apparent arisal of H. sapiens —anatomical modernity—now set at ca. 300-
200kya (McDougall et al. 2005, Hublin et al. 2017, Schlebusch et al. 2017, Lipson et al. 2020), and 
the stabilization of the archaeological assemblage associated with characteristic human 
behavioural and cognitive capacities, such as sophisticated sociality or symbolic expression, after 
ca. 100-50 kya (Renfrew 1996, 2009, Henshilwood and Marean 2003). The temporal mismatch 
was thought by archaeologist Colin Renfrew to pose a genuine explanatory puzzle – the so-called  
“sapient paradox”: why did it take more than 100.000 years for the modern body to meet the 
modern mind?  
Over twenty years, a richer set of archaeological and paleontological specimens, as well as 
genomic data from Africa and globally, provided richer contextual information about population 
and species distribution, migration and interaction, and more sophisticated accounts of the 
factors underlying material complexity (see Galway-Witham et al. 2019 for a review). As we’ll 
describe in section 2, what counts as a relevant archaeological signal in this context has been 
progressively rethought and the evolutionary models explaining such signals have been 
complexified, thus significantly reshaping our conception of behavioural modernity.  
Today, the nonlinear and divergent ways in which traits of behavioural modernity appeared 
in various regional contexts are ever-more emphasized features of the archaeological record. 
Recent research has increasingly moved away from saltationist and hardwired causal 
approaches, making older classificatory and interpretive strategies no longer on par with current 
epistemic standards, yet some of these are retained. In section 3 we highlight one example of 
this – Rubicon expectation – where archaeological investigation and categorization are expected 
to provision a kind of ‘switch-point’ marking where and when the phenomenon arose. For 
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behavioural modernity, this involves identifying discrete and unambiguous cognitive or 
behavioural boundaries that should divide early and late anatomically modern humans (AMHs)1, 
or biologically distinct hominin species. 
To capture these crucial features in the evolution of the research surrounding behavioural 
modernity, in section 4 we will develop an account of ‘investigative disintegration’. 
Investigations disintegrate when a once-clear phenomenon becomes complexified such that the 
epistemic structure of the investigation transforms. Disintegration, we’ll show, doesn’t simply 
involve changes to empirical and theoretical regimes but shifts in explanatory weight. Previously, 
the explanatory weight on accounts of behavioural modernity fell on explaining when and how 
distinctive cognitive and behavioural clusters of traits arose. In the new context the explanatory 
weight falls on the conditions by which such traits became sufficiently stabilized at a regional 
scale for cumulative cultural evolution.  We’ll argue that recent discoveries and new interpretive 
perspectives have changed the explanatory game such that ‘Rubicon’-style explanations and 
approaches to categorization are not adequate for the current research agenda, and thus cannot 
carry the explanatory weight required for understanding the phenomenon.  We’ll argue that in 
light of investigative disintegration the significance of archaeological discoveries regarding 
modernity should shift, but that despite all this, the concept of ‘behavioural modernity’ should 
be retained.  
Our paper, then, is intended both to provide a philosophical analysis of ‘investigative 
disintegration’, which we suspect is a not-infrequent scientific phenomenon, and to apply our 
analysis to the evolving research agenda targeting behavioural modernity. We’ll do this in two 
 
1 Although the usage of the term “anatomically modern humans” may vary in scope, it was introduced to distinguish 




major steps. The first, sections 2 and 3, will summarize and critique research on behavioural 
modernity. The second, comprising sections 4 and 5, will shift to more abstract philosophical 
analysis, analysing investigative disintegration and bringing it to bear on behavioural modernity. 
2.  Behavioural Modernity in hindsight 
 
How ‘behavioural modernity’ is understood, as well as the proposed mechanisms underlying 
its emergence, have been radically transformed (d’Errico and Stringer 2011, Davies 2019). In this 
section, we’ll discuss how the relationship between the archaeological record and the 
phenomenon at hand has shifted as new data has come online, before tracing the new 
explanatory models that have been produced in light of this. 
2.1 Signals of Modernity 
From an archaeological perspective, ‘behavioural modernity’ can be understood as a 
phenomenon inferred from the record based on a constellation of material proxies taken to be 
revelatory of complex cognitive, technical and social lives. Debate, then, often turns on the 
appearance and distribution of such proxies (Henshilwood and Marean 2003). These traditionally 
took the form of ‘trait-lists’: an inventory of discrete detectable material signatures taken to 
provide universal indicators of modern behaviour. Common examples are new lithic 
technologies (blades and microblades), the appearance of composite tools; worked bone, antler 
and ivory; long distance exchange of raw materials; seasonal mobility and exploitation of 
resources; elaborate and varied art forms such as engravings, sculptures and cave paintings; 
musical instruments; widespread use of personal ornaments; manipulation of symbol and 




Such trait-lists were initially based on Upper Palaeolithic European sites (henceforth UP; Mellars 
and Stringer 1989, Gamble 1994). Through the noughties lists more reflective of the African 
Middle Stone Age (MSA) were developed in an attempt to correct this Eurocentric bias 
(McBrearty and Brooks 2000, Deacon 2001). Critically, signatures were no longer treated as a 
package deal or a ‘syndrome’, instead they were taken to reflect scattered origins in space and 
time. Lately, research has targeted particular aspects of material culture thought to provide clear 
signals of behavioural modernity: what we call archaeological “golden spikes”. These focus 
especially on symbolic expression tied to, for instance, pigment processing (e.g., ochre) or bead 
production (Wadley 2001, Henshilwood and Marean 2003, Tattersall 2008, Marean 2015).  
It now seems like an obvious mistake to use the European UP record (ca. 40 to 10kya) as an 
empirical yardstick to establish contrasts between late and early modern Homo sapiens in Africa 
(Deacon 2001; D’Errico 2003; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Shea 2011). However, some have 
argued that recognising the limitations and European origin of such working definitions has 
neither led to complete abandonment nor to replacement with substantially different 
approaches (Barham and Mitchell 2008). Employing the record of any single region as a standard 
for judging global patterns in human evolution risks conflating regional dynamics and universal 
trends (especially if fieldwork has been historically prioritized in that region, Gamble 1999, Shea 
2011). To see this, let’s trace some influential developments in how modernity has been detected 
in the archaeological record. 
Against Eurocentrism, McBrearty and Brooks (2000) developed a trait list aimed at better 
reflecting the depth and complexity of the African archaeological record, thus showing that 
many purported European innovations had African precursors. They proposed four sets of traits 
characterizing modern behaviour: abstract thinking; planning depth; behavioural, technological 
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and economic innovativeness and—notably—symbolic behaviour. These were linked with 
numerous archaeological signatures which were taken to demonstrate their acquisition. As we’ll 
see in 2.2, the overall model behind the appearance of such traits differs substantially from those 
developed based on the UP European package. However, the list, as D’Errico (2003) rightly 
noted, lacked cross-cultural comparative analysis of various human societies and was still derived 
from local material culture (African MSA and, to a lesser extent, the UP). This, he argued, 
provides poor heuristics for testing modern characteristics of populations living in different 
environments which might have followed different evolutionary trajectories. 
Henshilwood and Marean (2003) identified four major flaws in defining behavioural modernity 
through trait-lists (or, as Wadley 2001 ironically called them, “shopping lists”): empirical 
derivation, ambiguity, lack of theoretical grounding and taphonomic bias2. Although these 
objections first applied to European-derived traits, they are plausibly applicable to any attempt 
to approach modern behaviour through trait-lists developed from particular sites and particular 
time periods as opposed to world-wide anthropological and ethnographic data (see also Wynn 
et al 2016). So, deriving markers from geographically localized archaeological records (be they 
African MSA or European UP) makes behavioural modernity unambiguously recognizable only in 
the records on which the list was based (D’Errico and Banks 2013). Further, proxies taken to 
signal newly evolved capacities may instead be reactions to resource intensification or 
population pressure (hence, they are ambiguous because other processes can be invoked to 
explain their appearance in the record). Moreover, the inclusion of some traits in the lists seems 
to lack proper theoretical justification: for example, seasonal mobility, besides varying widely 
among living humans, is known to be practiced by some non-human species as well (Wadley 
 
2 Taphonomic bias refers here to the differential preservation in the archaeological record of the traits used to 
diagnose behavioural modernity. This can likely lead to false negative findings about modern behaviour in regions 
where the potential for preservation is generally low. 
8 
 
2001). Finally, as with many archaeological investigations, taphonomic biases are a constant 
worry, especially in equatorial contexts where biotic preservation (e.g. bone or antler tools) is 
unlikely.  
Having critiqued trait-lists as being inherently flawed, Henshilwood and Marean conclude that a 
better approach would be to instead focus on one particular proxy that gathers consensus for 
being a crucial modern human feature: symbolic expression and its material signatures. 
Frequently cited are data signalling symbolic capacities from South African sites, such as mineral 
pigment modification (ochre) and perforated shells found at Blombos Cave (100-70 kya), later 
reinforced by new finds and revised dates at other sites (see Wadley 2015 for an updated review). 
This all led to a growing focus on a “golden spike” for modernity: the entry into the record of 
materials thought to unambiguously signal symbolism. These, as we’ll show, are in fact equally 
susceptible to the flaws identified for trait-lists. In section 4 we’ll argue that both trait-lists and 
‘golden-spikes’ are problematic when used as Rubicons, in light of investigative disintegration.  
Another thread running alongside debates about proxies asks whether behavioural modernity 
can (or should) identify a unique set of behaviours characterizing AMHs and not other hominin 
species. Where previously behavioural modernity was meant to distinguish our species from 
Neanderthal proxies, as Zilhao provocatively noted these often ended up “defining some 
modern humans as behaviourally Neandertal and some Neandertal groups as behaviourally 
modern” (2006). As archaeological signals of behavioural modernity became increasingly 
diffuse, identifying the phenomenon as a particular process restricted to a single lineage became 
less plausible, especially in light of parallel arguments stressing the cognitive and social 
sophistication of our non-sapiens cousins (e.g., Stiner 2017; Villa and Roebroeks 2014). However, 
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some still object that complex traits such as imaginative and symbolic intelligence were 
expressed less systematically in Neanderthals (Tattersall 2017). 
Problems of definition regarding what exactly is meant by the term ‘behavioural modernity’ 
persist (see Nowell 2010), but elaborating definitory alternatives is outside our scope (we’ll likely 
end up reproducing old problems in new forms)3. We’ll continue referring to ‘behavioural 
modernity’ with the purpose of highlighting the various investigative dimensions along which 
research has ‘disintegrated’ (see section 4), stressing available and more promising ways of 
rethinking the problem at hand. This disintegration of our conceptions of the phenomenon of 
behavioural modernity has led to the generation of new explanatory models, which we’ll turn to 
now. 
2.2 Models of Modernity 
Alongside asking how behavioural modernity should be detected in the archaeological record—
how to characterize the phenomenon at hand—researchers have developed various models for 
the evolution of behaviourally modern characteristics in hominin populations. Such models differ 
with regards to the evolutionary trajectory of behavioural change, the geographic focus, and 
timing and relevant causal factors (see table 1 below). 
 
3 As Kim Sterelny suggests,  defining behavioural modernity as falling within the range of variation of ethnographically 




Table 1. Main characteristics of selected models for the evolution of behavioural modernity.  
Here are summarized six main models that are reviewed in the paper (though more have been proposed).  Although overlaps 
and similarities are clearly possible, the distinctions are useful for detecting relevant differences in one or more of the 
following features: trajectory, timing, geographical focus and range of causal factors.   
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In the 80’s and 90’s, the basic picture of how and when our hominin ancestors became like 
us was commonly understood. According to the “Upper Paleolithic model”, the path leading to 
the modern mind was abrupt and exclusively associated with AMHs and their arrival in Europe 
(Mellars and Stringer 1989; Klein 1989a, 1989b; Diamond 1992; Bar-Yosef 1998, 2002). The 
archaeological record of the UP , exhibiting a proliferation of new, successful technological and 
cultural changes suggested a “lightbulb moment” in human evolution. Early trait-list approaches 
on which the revolutionary scenario was based tended to suggest that innovations arrived as a 
‘package’ during the Middle to Upper Palaeolithic transition (MP-UP). This inflection in the 
record was interpreted not as a biased discontinuity but as reflecting a major cognitive and 
behavioural breakthrough, a “creative explosion” (Mithen 1998, Renfrew 2009) so marked that 
some scholars argued it was probably caused by a selectively advantageous genetic mutation, 
occurring around 50-40 kya, affecting brain functioning and internal organization (Klein 1989a, 
1989b). Others thought of changes in the anatomical or cognitive basis for spoken complex 
language as a plausible answer (e.g. Diamond 1992; Mellars 1996). 
Within this perspective, there is an “impossible coincidence” (Mellars 2005) between Homo 
sapiens’ range expansion across the European continent (following the so-called Out-of-Africa, 
OOA, dated at ca. 70-60 kya) and the almost simultaneous emergence throughout the Old World 
of technological and cultural innovations marking MP-UP transition. Resolving the coincidence 
led to a “single-species model” for the origin of modern behaviour, which excluded the 
convergent or parallel evolution of cognitive sophistication in other archaic hominin lineages 
(notably Neanderthals), thus accounting for the different evolutionary trajectories followed by 
“invaders” sapiens and “indigenous” Neanderthal populations, the former replacing the latter 
(ivi; see Villa and Roebroeks 2014 for criticism). 
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However, as we’ve seen in section 2.1, a growing body of archaeological evidence supports 
the emergence of key cultural innovations in Africa before the purported European creative 
explosion. A wealth of counterevidence has accumulated against the “revolution” scenario, that 
many take to favour a more gradual evolutionary picture.  
According to McBrearty and Brook’s explanatory model, modern behaviour must have been 
the consequence of Homo sapiens’ speciation in Africa. Therefore, a gradual accretion of 
innovations should be visible in the archaeological record as a result of the selective pressures 
leading to the emergence of AMHs (McBrearty and Brooks 2000, Marean et al. 2007). The time-
lag between the origin of anatomical modernity and signals of behavioural modernity is 
considerably reduced within the gradualist perspective and associated with the onset of the 
African MSA. In explaining the expansion from Africa no genetically encoded, dramatic change 
is invoked: traits characterizing modern human behaviour were developed by hominin groups 
through cognitive and behavioural capabilities that were plausibly already in place. However, it 
has also been argued that the accretionary pattern could be a methodological artifact, due to 
mixing traits belonging to the African MSA and the European UP (Shea 2011, D’Errico and Banks 
2013). 
Rather than abandoning the idea of a breakthrough, some researchers placed it earlier and 
in Africa. For instance, Mellars (2006) has proposed that this moment should be located between 
60 and 80kya in southern Africa, concomitantly with a major population expansion and with the 
appearance of technological and behavioural innovations in the Still Bay and Howiesons Poort 
industries that, he argues, sharply contrast with those of earlier African MSA sites (see also 
Henshilwood and Dubreuil 2011).  Although invoking adaptive environmental processes as a 
parsimonious (and more prosaic) explanation, Mellars nonetheless argues that significant 
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changes in human neurological and cognitive capacities can in no way be ruled out. Henshilwood 
and Dubreuil (2011) invoke a reorganization in modern H. sapiens of the temporoparietal areas 
implicated in higher theory of mind. Klein (2000, 2013, 2019) explicitly ties behavioural change to 
a fortuitous mutation or a novel gene constellation promoting the fully modern brain and the 
onset of the African Later Stone Age (LSA, 50-45 kya). 
In parallel, however, alternative models have gained increasing consensus, radically 
reshaping the relevant questions and tackling different aspects of behavioural modernity. For 
example, the “demographic perspective” asks not how novelties emerge, but how cultural 
complexity is maintained (or lost) through time. Some scholars have argued that demography is 
a major determinant here, and that population size, density and migration activities, probably 
triggered by climatic and environmental dynamics, shaped the spatial structuring of cultural 
traits’ accumulation and evolution (Powell et al. 2009; Shennan 2001; Richerson et al. 2009), thus 
accounting for the asynchronous appearance, disappearance and re-emergence of key 
innovations within the African MSA.  
Others have highlighted that such demographic-based mechanisms, far from being the 
unique explanatory factor in the spread and maintenance of innovation (see Sterelny 2011 for 
the role of high-fidelity learning settings), are equally applicable to archaic hominins like 
Neanderthals, suggesting that their different evolutionary fate might have well been dependent 
on group size and rates of cultural exchange, rather than hardwired, “in-built” cognitive 
differences (d’Errico and Banks 2013; d’Errico and Henshilwood 2011).  
Partisans of this last view, dubbed the “cultural model” (d’Errico and Stringer 2011), expand 
on the demographic perspective, and argue that modernity is the result of cumulative cultural 
evolution among populations that already had the capacity to be cognitively modern irrespective 
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of taxonomic affiliation.  Much of the cognitive prerequisites and cerebral hardware of modern 
behaviour were perhaps already present among the last common ancestors of Neanderthals and 
modern humans.  
On such views, what explains the appearance, diffusion and acceptance of innovative 
behaviours – besides population pressures and demographic dynamics – is the ability of a society 
to create stable and high-fidelity learning settings within a specific, ecological and environmental 
context and given peculiar historical contingencies (D’Errico 2003; Zilhao 2007; Hovers and 
Belfer-Cohen 2006; d’Errico and Banks 2013). Here a multiple species model for the origin of 
behavioural modernity is invoked, contrasting the idea of a single speciation event as a main 
trigger. Modern traits appeared among different hominin groups and in different African and 
Eurasian regions, and the process of change (especially in the early phases of the MSA) was not 
linear nor progressive in nature, but rather followed a “mosaic” mode of evolution (see 
Parravicini and Pievani 2019). Here, innovations and traits appear and disappear (and reappear 
again in quite different forms, e.g. beads, see d’Errico et al. 2009) in an haphazard and irregular 
fashion, before becoming fully crystallized into a cohesive package. As for Europe, D’Errico 
(2003) does not exclude that contact among AMH and Neanderthals might have boosted 
innovation and the production of symbolic objects on both sides. What emerges then is an 
intricate and pluralistic picture, in which modern behaviour manifests itself as the result of 
multiple evolutionary trajectories followed by its constitutive traits, crosscutting hominin 
phylogeny.  
Although this is not the only scenario available in today’s approach to human cultural and 
cognitive evolution4, sociocultural and demographic based models (also aided by incorporation 
 
4 See for instance Klein’s (2019) recent reconfirmation of the hypothesis of a new climate-driven gene constellation, 
affecting cognitive and communicative potential. 
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of elements of the Evolutionary Extended Synthesis, see Kissel and Fuentes 2021) are redrawing 
the conceptual toolkit and investigation. Further, it is argued that such scenarios are more 
grounded in the available evidence compared to biologically based explanations, as they account 
for  patterns in the record without resorting to events that are not yet empirically sustained (nor 
easily testable). For instance, it is well-established that major population growth took place in 
Africa before the radiation into Eurasia, likely favouring cultural accumulation (Henn et al. 2012), 
whereas as of today no species-wide genetic sweep just before 50kya has been found (Mallick 
et al. 2016).   
It is clear that the notion of ‘behavioural modernity’ (and the whole research agenda around 
it, as we shall see) has undergone significant change. The causal link between modern anatomy 
and modern behaviour has been gradually loosened (along with the one human taxon/one 
cognition equation). In the case of our species, the speciation event associated with anatomical 
modernity (or perhaps even earlier events!) brought with it the genetically-endowed capacities 
required for behavioural modernity, which then slowly, in fits and starts, arose with the 
development of social environments scaffolding high-fidelity learning as well as sufficient 
demographic density to buffer information-flow and enable divided labor.  
Thus, the discovery of various signals of behavioural modernity across African time and place, 
and of others associated with archaic hominins (both in Africa and in Eurasia), as well as new 
theoretical horizons, have significantly disrupted once-settled conceptions of how the transition 
could have occurred, and what the transition even consisted of. 
3. Rubicon  expectations 
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Caesar’s crossing of the river Rubicon is framed as a kind of switch-point: a critical decision 
on his part which was necessary for the Roman Republic’s fall and the rise of its Empire. Similarly, 
many investigations into behavioural modernity retain classificatory and explanatory practices 
focused on an isolated ‘moment’ where humans became human, or on a major proxy that should 
fully account for the transition. The shifts we’ve seen in our understanding of behavioural 
modernity undermine such approaches. We’ll make our argument, before contextualizing it with 
respect to common archaeological practice. 
3.1 Against Rubicons 
We call “Rubicon expectation” in the context of behavioural modernity the practice of 
establishing a boundary  that is expected to provide a non-ambiguous and universally applicable 
benchmark for modernity, and then monitoring the archaeological record for it, thus inferring 
which hominin group, when and where, crossed it. Once such a  benchmark for modernity is set, 
hominin populations/species are judged as “behaviourally modern” if their material culture 
meets it.  
Three intertwined issues are at play that are worth distinguishing more clearly. One problem 
(i) involves the idea that the behavioural modernity phenomenon can be reduced to a major, big 
breakthrough, i.e. a key-trait model of what makes us humans different from other hominin 
lineages5. A second, related problem (ii) concerns translating this view into non-ambiguous 
material signatures that can be identified in different archaeological contexts. A third (iii) 
involves interpreting the underlying processes that produced such signatures. As seen in the 
previous sections these interpretations have long had an inclination towards ‘switch-point’ 
 
5 See Currie (2019a) for general discussion of such one-shot hypotheses. 
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explanations, often based on biologically mediated or hardwired causal factors. Our argument, 
in short, is that the new evidence and models we discussed in the previous section have 
transformed our conception of (iii), but many of the approaches underwriting (i) and (ii) have 
not as yet caught up. 
 As we saw in the previous sections, a number of empirical findings regarding the timing, 
location and pace of the appearance of innovations are no longer consistent with explanations 
attributing them to concomitant genetic or otherwise biologically mediated processes (iii). 
These have pushed research towards a picture in which the mosaic appearance and 
disappearance of innovations in both the African and the Eurasian record is explored through 
multiple, interacting factors – demographic, social, cultural transmission, environmental, 
ecological (cfr. d’Errico and Banks 2013) – before coalescing in a stabilized and expanding human 
niche (cfr. Sterelny 2011; Foley 2016; Kissel and Fuentes 2018). Despite this, Rubicon expectations 
and classificatory approaches (involving i, ii) are retained from older explanatory strategies, 
falling out of phase with respect to current theoretical and empirical advancements (section 4 
will develop a philosophical account of this in terms of ‘investigative disintegration’). Rubicon 
expectations, we argue,  might bias research in that they  (still) implicitly depict the evolution of 
behavioural complexity as a demarcation problem, revolving around the identification of a major 
event, i.e the onset of a competence or class of features capable of telling apart modern from 
non-modern records, human from non-human makers. By placing the explanatory and empirical 
burden on the Rubicon, distortions easily arise. 
We’ve seen how the attempt to use the European UP material record as a Rubicon for other 
archaeological contexts to meet failed, most significantly for empirical reasons. However, 
pushing back the temporal horizon for the purported boundary or focusing on one major 
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demarcation criterion for behavioural modernity, such as symbolically mediated behaviour 
treated as a “golden spike”, does not escape the idea that behavioural modernity requires a 
significant Rubicon to be crossed. Let us briefly consider this last case and the problems it poses.   
Symbolic behaviour and related inventories of symbolic expression are considered by many 
to be the crux of modernity (Chase and Dibble 1987; Wadley 2001; Henshilwood and Marean 
2003, Tattersall 2008, Marean 2015). Although what is classified as symbolic varies considerably 
(Kissel and Fuentes 2018), generally material items such as personal ornamentations, use of 
ochre (with no discernible function), artwork, and practices like burial and other ritualistic 
activities, are linked to symbolic expression. However, artifacts and practices are not inherently 
imbued with symbolism and the lack of information about the cultural systems in which those 
artifacts acquired meaning poses a concrete limitation, making physical symbols equally fallible 
indicators of cultural richness (Sterelny 2011, Kissel and Fuentes 2017, Currie and Meneganzin 
forthcoming). 
 Besides this, a more fundamental problem derives from what pushes the intuitive urge of 
identifying a Rubicon in the first place. That is, the belief that symbolic behaviour (or whatever 
else) captures the quintessence of being human, a trait (however complex) that should be 
considered exclusive to our lineage (White 1940). In the case of symbolic expression, this seems 
evident in Henshilwood and Marean (2003) equating the expression “modern human behaviour” 
with “fully symbolic sapiens behaviour” (p.644). This reproduces an old methodological 
problem. Replacing the old trait-list with an archaeological golden spike does no more than 
recreate the form of circular reasoning previously criticized regarding the  UP ‘revolution’: if we 
define the capacity for symbolism as an exclusive human trait – being it, again, empirically 
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derived from the material record of AMHs – we already know which assemblages will pass the 
modernity test. 
Nonetheless, recent findings (although not without controversy) suggest that archaic 
populations were capable of symbolic expression, blurring the purported boundary between 
symbolic and non-symbolic species. Early glimmerings of possible instances of symbolic material 
culture (like abstract engravings and carvings) are reported at very ancient sites (800 -300 kya, 
according to Colagè and D’Errico 2018), suggesting that the capacity for symbolic thought may 
have deeper phylogenetic roots . One ancient evidence of symbolic expression has been attested 
from an engraved clam shell from Trinil (Java), dated at ca. 540-430kya and attributed to Homo 
erectus (Joordens et al. 2015). More significantly, different European Neanderthal sites contain 
traces that have been suggested to be symbolic in nature. These include burials, pigment use, 
personal ornamentations, collection of natural rare items and possibly cave art (Zilhao 2007; 
Hovers and Belfer-Cohen 2006; Villa and Roebroeks 2014; Hoffman et al. 2018). When these 
expressions are not discarded as illegitimate or ambiguous in their intentions (probably because 
their evaluation is, in some cases, highly dependent upon the AMH-derived yardstick, i.e. the idea 
there is only one way of being truly symbolic), moving targets for behavioural modernity easily 
arise.  
Strictly related to the issue of circularity is a second methodological problem, which we take 
to be even more pressing: capturing change in a mosaic-like transition. If the evolution of modern 
behaviour and complexity does not follow a unique path of development, but takes place along 
multiple trajectories, defined by different times, modes, locations and including various 
combinations of traits, then the processual nature of the phenomenon makes Rubicons unable 
to snap-shot a clear dichotomy between modern and non-modern assemblages, simply because 
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no harsh dichotomy is to be expected. This also means that every temporal ‘photograph’ in the 
evolution of a complex feature such as symbolic expression must be interpreted from an 
evolutionary standpoint, i.e. bearing in mind that early glimmerings – or even evidence 
associated with other hominin groups – are expected to be different from Late Pleistocene or 
even modern-day manifestations. Thus, instead of seeing proxies of behavioural modernity as 
indicators of whether we have behavioural modernity or not—classifying the relevant 
population as ‘archaic’ or ‘modern’—they are instead data relevant for understanding the 
mosaic of processes which eventually enabled cultural, informational and demographic 
stabilization. 
 This brings us to the explanatory dimension. No proxy in itself, not even symbolic expression, 
can alone have special significance. Placing the Rubicon when symbolic manifestations already 
show a stabilized signal (as Klein 2019 seems to do in recognizing an abrupt inflection in the 
record, marked by the appearance of the LSA in Africa, and simultaneously, of the Eurasian 
Upper Palaeolithic) is not particularly informative nor decisive for assessing questions 
surrounding behavioural modernity, if it is not subsumed under the question of which 
mechanisms allow for the retention and proliferation of those expressions, as well as for the 
toleration of their costs. This does not mean downplaying the importance of detecting 
manifestations of symbolic expression (or other traits) in the archaeological record: rather, 
explanatory efforts should be directed at the mechanisms behind the transition, not its 
archaeological symptoms. As Ames et al. (2013) effectively put it: 
Shifting the focus to identifying broader patterns of human adaptive strategies in social 
and ecological context still depends on our ability to document fluctuations in material 
culture through time and space, but it differs from the practice of monitoring the 
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presence/absence of traits by singling out the range of behavioural strategies employed 
as the target of analysis, as opposed to trying to figure out whether or not a given 
assemblage passes the modernity threshold. In a way, this is an operationalization of the 
recognition that modern behaviour is a mosaic concept that needs to be interpreted as a 
function of its wider social and ecological contexts (Ibid. 36) 
Thus, on our view, the continued use of Rubicons to demarcate behaviourally modern from 
non-modern hominins represents an outdated and misplaced expectation that is ill-fitting with 
respect to current knowledge and awareness of the complexity of the phenomenon. However, 
isn’t it the case that linking material culture to social and cognitive capacities is common in 
archaeology? In the next subsection, we’ll further contextualize our position. 
3.2 Achaeological business-as-usual and Rubicons 
Behavioural modernity, as we’ve seen so far, is identified in the record via archaeological 
assemblages taken to be signals of complex cognitive and social traits.  This, in many ways, is 
archaeological business-as-usual. Archaeological categorization typically identifies cultural 
groupings via signals in the archaeological record: the ‘Clovis peoples’ identified by arrowheads 
across North America being a famous example. In paleoanthropological contexts, such 
categories are typically highly theoretical, based on ideas of the minimal cognitive, technological 
and social capacities required to construct such material remains (Currie & Killin 2019, Pain 
forthcoming). Such inferences often aim to identify the latest time that the capacity is present. 
So, hominin groups with, for instance, ochre use or beaded shells (keeping in mind the 
ambiguities of artifact significance that we mentioned) are categorized as behaviourally modern 
because it is taken that such material items signal symbolic expression. This approach has led to 
focus on a series of ‘Rubicons’ which various groups have taken to have crossed or failed to: 
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archaeologists examine assemblages, identifying some groups as modern and other groups as 
not. Rubicons also set the significance of finds: discovering, say, ochre use in earlier times, or at 
wider ranges with respect to models’ expectations, are treated as highly surprising and worthy 
of publication in prestigious journals. As such, Rubicons do a lot of work structuring 
archaeological investigation. 
In light of the shifting research agenda for behavioural modernity, however, we think 
Rubicon expectations are unproductive and distortive lenses which actively undermine research. 
Recent models of the emergence of behavioural modernity understand it as a ‘process’ rather 
than an ‘event’ (Kissel & Fuentes 2018), or as ‘threshold’ in the bandwidth and fidelity of 
expertise flow (Sterelny 2011). We could describe it as an ‘emergent property’ that belongs to a 
social group and which arises (and becomes visible) from the collaborative functioning of a 
system of interrelated factors (biological, cognitive, social-demographic, cultural). More 
specifically, we could envisage feedback systems of interactions according to which cultural 
practices can have direct effects on the cognitive capabilities of hominin populations and the 
neural substrates of individuals, constructing developmental environments to which future 
generations are exposed and amplifying learning capacities (see also Heyes 2018).   
Despite differences, recent approaches hold in common the idea that the material record 
does not simply track innate capacities -- what Sterelny  (2011, 2017) calls  the ‘simple reflection 
model’ and whose ‘bottom-up-only’ direction of dependence is criticized by Colagè and d’Errico 
(i.e. the idea of a straightforward chain from genetic changes, to brain anatomy and physiology, 
to cognitive skills, to the package of cultural innovations that make us human, cfr. Colagè and 
d’Errico 2018). Rather, signals in the record showing the preservation and expansion of 
innovations reflect the culturally evolved and maintained epistemic niche of human groups. As 
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such, inferring from the absence of material symbolism (say) to the fact that it did not exist and 
hence to archaic capacities—categorizing that group as non-behaviourally modern—is a 
mistake. It may rather reflect contingencies in that group’s ecological and cultural context, not 
innate capacities. More careful use of proxies, such as simply being signals of the latest possible 
presence of the capacities (Killin & Pain 2021) are also undermined. On these models, we’re not 
primarily interested in identifying when the innate capacities may have arose (as the basic 
prerequisites might have a deeper evolutionary history, and they’re potentially spread across 
many hominin taxa), but in mosaic patterns of loss and stabilization. 
Further, identifying particular finds as significant in virtue of, as it were, being in the wrong 
time and place is not particularly informative, nor does it meet the explanatory objectives of 
today’s research. If we’re looking for a Rubicon, then finds in earlier times or different locations 
are anomalous; however, if we’re expecting  a  threshold effect they are not.  
 
4. Disintegration 
It might be tempting to read the scientific developments thus far via hum-drum processes 
of hypothesis-testing. The hypothesis that behavioural modernity consists in changes in 
intrinsic cognitive capacities arising as the result of a genetically-mediated ‘quantum leap’ in a 
localized population and region (e.g. Mellars and Stringer 1989, Bar-Yosef 1998, Klein 1989, 
2000, 2013, 2019) came under increasing empirical pressure as new paleoanthropological and 
archaeological data came online, leading to the development of new hypotheses which better 
accommodated the picture’s complexity. There is no doubt something to this: such hypotheses 
have indeed been tested and put under pressure (cfr. Mallick et al 2016); but in this section 
we’ll argue for a different reading. The new data doesn’t simply test hypotheses, they also 
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transform our conception of target phenomena, the investigation has ‘disintegrated’, and this 
has important consequences for the kinds of explanations we should prefer and the epistemic 
structure of the investigation.  
We’ll foreshadow our account by responding to two immediate worries. First, you might 
think the term ‘disintegration’ is a bit dramatic: as we’ll discuss below, we’ve not had to abandon 
swathes of empirical data relevant to behavioural modernity, and indeed in 5 we’ll argue in 
defence of retaining the notion itself (once adequately updated)6. But disintegration comes in 
degrees7. We’ve shifted from behavioural modernity being an integrated package of cognitive 
traits aligned with a particular set of assemblages, to something much more disparate and 
complex in its explanatory dimensions. It is this partial process that our account of disintegration 
seeks to capture.  
Second, you might worry that the driving thought—that new conceptions of phenomena 
can change what counts as explanatorily adequate—is trivial. If we’re convinced of the 
context-sensitivity of explanation, then of course changes to context involve changes in 
explanatory adequacy. But this is too quick: investigative disintegration involves more than 
changes to what explanation we want, it also involves changes to an investigation’s epistemic 
structure, and this can have important consequences for, for example, the significance of new 
finds (we’ll discuss some of these upshots in section 5). Beyond explanation’s context-
sensitivity, we are interested in the dynamics of explanation, something Max Dresow has 
recently highlighted: 
 
6 We can indeed imagine more dramatic forms of disintegration, for instance cases in which it is no longer possible 
to save anything from the previous understanding of the target phenomenon (we would intuitively call such cases 
“disruption” or “dissolution” of the target phenomenon). But exploring them would bring us beyond the scope of 
the current paper.    
7  It might help the reader to space the word out: dis-integration. 
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[the dynamics of explanation illuminates] the temporal dimension of explanation 
considered as an open-ended and collaborative process. Here we are not concerned with 
single explanations (or at least we needn’t be), but rather with teams of explainers working 
jointly or in competition. (Dresow forthcoming, 2, italics in original) 
As Dresow points out, the dynamics of explanation lead us to focus on the relationship 
between how explanations unfold and the investigative contexts in which they are embedded. 
For behavioural modernity, new empirical findings and new theoretical tools have radically 
reshaped explanatory expectations and goals, which we’ll characterize in terms of ‘investigative 
disintegration’: new understanding of the phenomenon, driven by new data and new 
interpretations of already available evidence, has reshaped the kind of questions we’re asking 
and the kind of answers we want. Following Dresow, the dynamics of explanation are not simply 
about explanation, but about how explanatory expectations interact with, and are shaped by, 
efforts to characterize phenomena.  
To capture the notion of investigative disintegration we’ll turn to Alan Love’s work.  
4.1 Problem Agendas 
The notion of a problem agenda is useful for framing investigative disintegration. A ‘problem 
agenda’ is, in effect, a list of questions unified not by a theoretical perspective nor method, but 
by a phenomenon of interest. As Love puts it: “A problem agenda… is a “list” of interrelated 
questions (both empirical and conceptual) that are united by some connection to natural 
phenomena” (Love 2006, 877). The agenda sets the role that various explanatory and evidential 
components play in understanding that phenomenon, particularly setting explanatory adequacy. 
That is, what kinds of answers count as a passable answer to the question at hand—if you want, 
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which hypotheses are relevant. Further, this assigns ‘explanatory burden’ to some components 
of research over others. 
Because general criteria of explanatory adequacy provide structure to the explanatory 
burden associated with problem agendas, this epistemological account has the resources 
for ascertaining what disciplinary contributions are prerequisites for adequate 
explanations. The structure of a complex problem set derived from making the criteria of 
adequacy explicit highlights what different conceptual resources must be drawn upon to 
produce an acceptable explanatory vantage point (Ibid, 878).  
Research into the deep past is by its nature multidisciplinary and integrative: the traces of past 
events and trends are often scarce, distorted and varied, requiring scientists to draw together a 
wide range of techniques, methods and theoretical resources to integrate the varied evidence 
available from historical records (Chapman & Wylie 2016, Currie 2018). Problem agendas are a 
useful way of understanding the various roles data and theory can have in these complex 
investigations. To illustrate this through a nonhuman example, let’s dip our toes into discussion 
of the evolution of obligate grazing amongst ungulates in the later Miocene (based on Janis 
2008). 
The basal diet of ungulates is based on browsing, consuming the leaves and stems of plants, as 
well as fruit. Although grass arose earlier, it didn’t become an extensive feature of global biota 
until the later Cenozoic (say, 25ma). As grass spread, so also did grazing in ungulates as they 
adapted to the new environments. Obligate grazing arose in Equids in North America and Bovidae 
in Africa. A relevant phenomenon of interest is variation in size between the obligate grazers, 
horses and bovids, and the browsers which includes giants such as rhinoceros, giraffe and 
elephant. In short, browsers are able to attain larger sizes than grazers: why? 
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Identifying phenomena like size differences between grazers and browsers generates problem 
agendas, which we can understand as setting the role various data and theory play in the 
investigation. First, some evidence, as it were, frames the investigation: data about the timing of 
grassland spread and of related radiations, as well as general comparisons between browsing 
and grazing strategies. Second, many threads play a role in characterizing the phenomenon at 
hand: establishing the uniqueness of bovids and equines involves phylogenetic analysis, 
establishing the difficulties of grass consumption and digestion, and the particular strategies 
adopted by various ungulates. Framing and characterizing the phenomenon help set 
explanatory adequacy but does not meet it. An explanatorily adequate answer to our question 
must identify what is different about obligate grazers in contrast to other ungulates such that 
they are limited in size8. 
For instance, consider the role of highly hypsodont molars. Hypsodont teeth have high crowns 
and enamel reaching beyond the gum-line, and are commonly understood as an adaptation for 
dealing with abrasive vegetation. However, “not all hypsodont ungulates are grazers, as the 
silica contained in grass is far from the sole abrasive element in a herbivorous diet” (Janis 2008, 
29). Because hypsodoncy cannot tell between grazers and other ungulates, it alone doesn’t meet 
explanatory adequacy—cannot carry the explanatory weight—of the problem agenda. 
However, it can play a role in framing and characterizing by helping identify mixed dietary and 
grazing strategies when they arise in the fossil record. What is needed for adequacy is identifying 
a relevant difference between the various lineages.  
For instance, consider Clauss et al (2003)’s explanation. Obligate grazers typically use fore-gut 
digestion and are ruminants, an adaptation allowing for the digestion of grasses. Ruminants rely 
 
8 This in part relies on contrastive accounts of explanation, see for example Lipton 1990. 
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on delaying the passage of digestion, in order to have digesta available for re-chewing. Thus, 
digesta passage-time in ruminates is slower than in hindgut fermenters, and passage time scales 
with body-size. So, the larger a ruminant becomes, the longer digestion takes. This limits body-
size because the efficiency by which acetic acid is converted to methane and carbon dioxide 
breaks down at longer digestion times. So, because hindgut fermenters generally have quicker 
digestion, they can afford larger sizes than foregut fermenters. Clauss et al’s explanation is 
adequate due to identifying a relative difference between hindgut and foregut fermentation, 
capturing why the former have size constraints the latter do not. 
Let’s apply the example. We can understand a problem agenda as structuring the various roles 
data, evidence and theory plays in an investigation. An agenda picks out a particular 
phenomenon (that hindgut fermenters attain larger sizes than foregut ruminants) and in virtue 
of this some information takes on characterizing roles (size patterns and phylogenetics amongst 
ungulates), some framing roles (the various mechanisms and efficiency of digestive strategies) 
and others the explanatory burden set by explanatory adequacy (the constraints foregut 
digestion place on size). It doesn’t follow from this that Clauss et al’s explanation is right, simply 
that it is explanatorily adequate given the problem agenda. 
Problem agendas can be highly sensitive to both empirical context and explanatory interests. 
Switching our question, say, to the timing of the arisal and spread of obligate grazing, 
restructures the investigation: adequacy now calls for capturing why ten million years ago, and 
not earlier, ruminants arose. But this should be no surprise to philosophers used to the context-
sensitivity of explanation. What we learn from Love’s framework is that it is not simply 
explanatory adequacy that shifts with context, but the roles data and theory play. Further—and 
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this is critical for investigative disintegration—learning new things about the underlying 
phenomenon can radically reshape explanatory adequacy and the agenda at large.  
4.2 Investigative Disintegration 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, philosophers of science have rightly shifted from general 
accounts of unity and disunity to accounts of local integration and independence across several 
dimensions (data, evidence, hypotheses, institutions, etc…). Less attention has been paid to 
what happens when phenomena of study turn out to be far different from once thought; when 
investigations ‘disintegrate’, a process which has plausibly occurred for behavioural modernity. 
In this section, we can characterize one form of investigative disintegration by drawing on Love’s 
machinery. In short, new information about the nature of the phenomenon9—shifts in how it is 
characterized—can dramatically reshape investigation. This has consequences both for what 
constitutes an adequate explanation of behavioural modernity, and how we should read it from 
the archaeological record.  
Let’s remind ourselves, then, of how the phenomenon of behavioural modernity has 
changed, before characterizing the notion of disintegration abstractly.  
We began tackling a relatively clear archaeological signal, the apparently sudden emergence, 
in the European UP, of a rich assemblage associated with symbolic expression, complex tool-use 
and so forth. This phenomenon shaped a problem agenda. First, the signal frames the 
investigation by discriminating between the biological emergence of H. sapiens and the 
appearance of behavioural modernity. Second, the distinction between anatomical and 
behavioural modernity sets relevant questions: what explains the ca. 150kya gap between our 
 
9 By ‘phenomenon’ we mean something similar to Bogen & Woodward (1988): a recurrent pattern inferred from data.  
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species’ evolution and our becoming behaviourally modern? Further, why was the emergence so 
sudden? Third, such questions drove a set of expectations: the explanatory weight is carried by 
a saltationist, often genetically-mediated mechanism involving a set of key innovations in a local 
population.  
However, over twenty years anomalies arose which didn’t simply undermine saltationist 
hypotheses, but reshaped the phenomenon, problem agendas and standards for explanatory 
adequacy. The discovery of increasingly diffuse, often partial, aspects of the assemblage 
identified with behavioural modernity earlier in the record challenges a saltationist picture and 
the idea that we should explain the origins of a ‘syndrome’, but so too does it challenge the usual 
way of understanding the distinction between behavioural and anatomical modernity. Instead 
of marking a genetic transition, we instead see a mosaic of potential precursors. Explanatory 
adequacy shifts from requiring a story about a single, localized origin, to asking after 
stabilization. Models of learning, social organization, demographics and niche stabilization take 
on explanatory weight previously carried, under many instances of “revolution” scenarios, by 
genetic or biological evolution. Again, as seen in the discussion of the evolution of obligate 
grazing, it doesn’t follow from this that such specific models are inevitably right, but that they 
are explanatorily adequate10. On this basis we can characterize investigative disintegration 
abstractly: 
 
10 Note  also how this differs from a simple case of epistemic pluralism. For pluralism to occur, under this perspective, 
multiple accounts must equally satisfy criteria of explanatory adequacy. But this is not the case of old and more recent 
Rubicon-based approaches, as seen above. There is however room for much pluralism regarding the nature of the 
stabilizing processes underwriting modernity.   
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Investigative disintegration, in such instances, occurs when: (1) the characterization of a 
phenomenon changes sufficiently for (2) different components of the problem agenda to 
take on explanatory weight11.  
Note that our definition of investigative disintegration doesn’t specify which factors might 
change how phenomena are characterized: we suspect a wide variety of influences could be at 
play, and want to avoid overgeneralizing from our example. For it is likely idiosyncratic. 
Investigation of behavioural modernity operates under ‘epistemic scarcity’ (Currie forthcoming): 
like many studies of the deep past, data is rare, fragile and difficult to manage. In virtue of this, 
phenomena are often highly sensitive to new incoming data. This scarcity in part explains how 
expanding paleoanthropological and archaeological discoveries (along with new theoretical 
frameworks) could so thoroughly reshape the epistemic landscape. Investigations with more 
systematic and manageable data could prove more intransigent. 
Moreover, we’re concerned here with forms of disintegration involving shifts in phenomena. 
Specifically, new ways of characterizing the phenomenon, driven by new finds and theoretical 
innovation, led to very different requirements in explanatory adequacy. But this is likely but one 
way the dynamics of investigation might shift. Other examples may include cases where changes 
in theory play a central role, say, but we’ll leave that more expansive discussion for later work. 
There are similarities between the phenomenon we highlight here and older systems within 
the philosophy of science. For instance, new evidence pertaining to behavioural modernity could 
be aligned with Kuhn’s ‘anomalies’ (Kuhn 1962), and the shifts in our conception of behavioural 
modernity might be aligned with shifts in Lakatosian ‘cores’ or progressive or regressive problem 
 
11 It might be tempting to see this as the arisal of a new problem-agenda. We don’t think much hangs on how precisely 
we delineate problem-agendas, context-sensitive as they are. 
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shifts (Lakatos 1976). It may be that what we pick out here could be captured with this 
machinery. However, there are important differences: both Kuhn and Lakatos are significantly 
more systematic than we wish to be.  For instance, comparing a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ to 
investigative disintegration reveals significant differences between them. We’ll briefly highlight 
two. 
First, differences in the degree of disintegration: because paradigms holistically structure 
research programs they appear to be an all-or-nothing affair, while the finer-grained structure 
afforded by disintegration can better capture the actual dynamics of research. This affords side-
stepping long-toothed worries about incommensurability while nonetheless allowing critical 
engagement with the dynamics of research. Although changes in how behavioural modernity is 
conceived has not led to a breakdown of communication or method, we’ve argued that it has 
involved certain practices—particularly those related to the categorization and significance of 
new finds—dragging behind the epistemic purposes of the reforming agenda. 
Second, the scope and organizing principles of research agendas differ from paradigms. It 
isn’t clear that behavioural modernity is anything like a paradigm (or the core of a research 
program for that matter): problem agendas tend to come into being in piecemeal, messy ways 
and tend to focus on significantly narrower targets than paradigms. More importantly, as 
research agendas focus on phenomena and how scientists characterize these, they are more 
appropriate for behavioural modernity than more ‘theory-centric’ approaches. This is simply 
because in this instance it has not been changes to wide-scale theory, nor evidence undermining 
such theory, that has ignited the change: it is primarily how new finds (and the reappraisal of old 
ones) have reshaped how the phenomenon is characterized.  
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Having said this, we are open to understanding these notions as ways of (as an anonymous 
reviewer nicely put it) ‘rescuing the morals of Kuhn’12. In a sense at least, understanding 
investigative disintegration is in step with understanding anomalies and their subsequent 
revolutions insofar as both are fundamentally interested in how unexpected discoveries shape 
the dynamics of research. The crucial difference, we think, is that investigative disintegration 
follows the crucially local, practice-oriented and dynamic turn of recent philosophy of science (a 
turn which, we’ve briefly suggested, is for the better, at least in this context). 
There is a certain tension in our use of the term ‘disintegration’: after all, it was the integration 
of new data which proved so thoroughly transformative. But this is what we should expect. 
Integration at some level can lead to disintegration at another, as science’s epistemic tapestry is 
warped around new discoveries, analytic techniques and models. This suggests a positive 
epistemic role for disintegration: too-closely integrated research programs might well lead to a 
too-strict, restricted, investigation. Such investigations are likely blind to alternative hypotheses 
due to a too-conservative focus (Stanford 2006, 2019, Currie 2019b, Schneider forthcoming).  
Our account then provides an additional nail in the coffin of the “jigsaw puzzle-metaphor”, often 
invoked to (mis)represent archaeological practice (see Chapman and Wylie 2016). The metaphor 
involves conceiving research progress as filling gaps and finding new pieces of information that 
will fit pre-existing schemas. Rather, empirical findings concerning behavioural modernity have, 
in an iterative fashion and with much theoretical innovation, led to the re-conception of what 
the phenomenon itself is, how it should be categorized, and how we should explain it.  
 
 
12 See Havstad & Smith (2019) for an excellent approach to rescuing the morals of Lakatos. 
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We don’t wish to derive more general normative claims about the role of disintegration in the 
dynamics of science, as there well may be more disruptive cases where target phenomena are 
completely dissolved and research achievements are not preserved (these may be instances 
analogous to Kuhn-loss, see also footnote 6; in the following section we’ll explain why this is not 
so for our case). Instead, in less dramatic circumstances, via ‘shaking up’ the research program, 
disintegration can lead to bursts of new ideas: something we’re witnessing for behavioural 
modernity. Thus, our position is not merely a description of the dynamics of research, there is 
also scope for understanding investigative disintegration as progressive, at least in the instance 
we’ve applied it to. 
 
5. The fate of ‘behavioural modernity’ 
In light of its mosaic emergence, the disparateness of its proxies and troublesome baggage both 
from Eurocentric origins and the hunt for Rubicons, we might be tempted to abandon 
‘behavioural modernity’ altogether. Shea (2011), for instance, attacks it for being qualitative, 
essentialist, and replicating the binary dichotomy between modern and nonmodern states.  
However, we think the abandonment of the notion should be resisted for three reasons. 
First, Shea proposes to focus instead on ‘behavioural variability’, defined as a “measurable 
quality of all human behaviour expressed in terms of modality, variance, skew, and other 
quantitative/ statistical properties” (ivi, p. 2). However, it is not clear how a focus on behavioural 
variability would avoid recreating old operational problems in a different context: to measure 
variability, some units of input will have to be counted and what units to consider will need to be 




Second, even after rejecting the problematic legacy of behavioural modernity, there is still 
something to be explained, making the adoption of a new notion too quick a move (perhaps 
even unnecessary). Shea seems to treat the idea that a relevant transition might have occurred 
as illegitimate (as reflected in the title of his paper, “Homo sapiens is as Homo sapiens was”). The 
archaeological assemblages associated with hominin activity 300-200kya display a radically 
different pattern of cultural and ecological flexibility, complexity and density to those 100-50kya. 
Explaining ‘behavioural modernity’ is to explain those genuinely puzzling differences in the 
record, despite the radical changes in how they are now conceptualized.  
Third, there is a potential unity to the explanations which are emerging, as indeed we might 
expect from some cases of investigative disintegration. That unity is not found in any pre-defined 
cultural expression or assemblage. There is not necessarily a particular signature or set thereof, 
be they ‘golden spikes’ or a trait-list, associated with behavioural modernity. But contingency 
and diversity at the level of cultural assemblage doesn’t undermine another kind of unity. 
 As we’ve seen, contemporary explanations point to demographic scale and sociocultural 
innovations (such as high-fidelity and high-volume social learning) as being necessary for the 
expression and stabilization of diverse hominin expressions. If they continue to bear out 
empirically, we should conclude that it is those processes which explain (or perhaps even 
constitute) behavioural modernity. The new explanations, then, are unified via pointing to a set 
of cultural and demographic processes regardless of the particular cultural and technological 
expressions they underwrite, the taxonomic affiliations at hand, or the material records that 
signal them. 
This leads us to two final points. First, we’ve argued that Rubicon practices and expectations in 
classification (classifying assemblages as ‘modern’ or ‘archaic’, for instance) are wrong-headed. 
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This is due to the progressive disintegration of the problem agenda—from conceiving of 
behavioural modernity as a shift in innate capacities to a shift in epistemic niche—and the 
complex nature of the target phenomenon, that Rubicons (otherwise not infrequent in 
archaeological investigations) are inappropriate for this kind of study.  
So, what should we do instead? Our argument in no way implies that discoveries in fieldwork are 
unimportant for filling out our picture of the emergence of behavioural modernity. Rather, it 
suggests such discoveries play a different role than previously thought. New finds do not shift 
when purported Rubicons were crossed, but instead help test and enrich models of how the 
mosaic emergence of behavioural modernity occurred and which conditions allowed for such 
threshold effects to become visible. As we’ve said, categorization in paleoanthropology is not 
theoretically innocent, but rather reflects the presumed mechanisms of evolutionary and 
cultural change. As we underlined above, finds and assemblages should be interrogated with 
respect to how they document cultural changes and the underlying mechanisms at a regional 
scale, not as reflecting shifts in in-built capacities.  
Second, Rubicon-based practices often govern what counts as significant in archaeology: it is 
discoveries which expand Rubicons that deserve special place in high-profile prestige journals, 
for instance. Finds which are earlier than we expect, or from unexpected geographical regions, 
take on the most significance as they shift “implicit” Rubicons or encourage revising outdated 
assumptions. Even within the processual understanding of behavioural modernity, finding 
precursors may be surprising: discovering, say, a flourishing musical tradition complete with 
tuned instruments 150kya would be quite remarkable. But if we think behavioural modernity is a 
mosaic and eventually stabilizing process reliant on demographic and cultural innovations, 
earlier precursors become less anomalous and their significance should be treated differently.  
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Ultimately what matters is enriching our picture of how those processes were enacted across 
different contexts. 
6. Conclusion 
We’ve aimed to both provide an analysis of how investigations of behavioural modernity 
have been reshaped over thirty years, and cover a hitherto underexplored feature of the 
dynamics of scientific research. Regarding the latter, where philosophers have analysed how 
new research agendas and repertoires form and stabilize, we’ve considered processes of 
disintegration: how evolving conceptions of phenomena can reshape what counts as 
explanatorily adequate for a research agenda. Regarding the former, behavioural modernity’s 
mosaic, partial and incremental nature undermines the still-common archaeological practice of 
categorizing assemblages and complex, transitional phenomena via strict Rubicons.  
During periods of destabilization and disintegration various scientific practices shift at 
different rates. We have analysed a disintegration process that began decades ago and it is still 
ongoing, with some practices not being aligned with the current problem agenda. We have also 
suggested – although we leave a more thorough examination to a future project – that 
investigative disintegration, in the form we analysed (as shifts in target phenomena), is a phase 
in the dynamics of research that can play a positive epistemic role, fostering new conceptual 
reorientations and eventually new forms of unity to explanations. 
There is much more to be said about investigative disintegration. As we’ve suggested, our 
example is likely idiosyncratic: examination of other cases is likely to demonstrate different 
dynamics and may be less focused on shifts in phenomena. Further, we’ve said nothing about 
the role of disciplinary and institutional shifts in disintegration, nor about broader social factors 
in driving scientific change. As for behavioural modernity, although the concept should be 
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understood as a threshold phenomenon rather than a discrete revolution, the notion still plays 
a critical role in holding together research agendas surrounding the evolution of our species. 
On our view, the new picture emerging of the evolution of H. sapiens has already put in place 
ways of rethinking the purpose and practice of how we identify and conceptualize behavioural 
modernity in the first place – a picture that points towards a complex and contextualized 
interplay between demographic and cultural factors, as well as ecological and biological 
dimensions, that are responsible for the stabilization and flourishing of  ‘modern’ human lifeways 
and diversity. 
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Acronyms  
AMHs Anatomically Modern Humans  
LSA Later Stone Age 
MSA Middle Stone Age 
MP-UP transition Middle to Upper Palaeolithic transition 
OOA Out of Africa 
UP Upper Palaeolithic  
